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In Hong Kong, the democracy movement is about to be run over by brute force, and
along with it a whole free and prosperous mega-city whose free citizens in the past
could freely voice their opinions and freely take to the streets and, while unable to
freely elect their representatives, were nevertheless protected against their abuse of
power by robust basic rights and strong and independent courts. This miracle, this
island of liberty and the rule of law in the middle of an authoritarian, if not totalitarian
state, has survived for almost a quarter of a century. That probably now comes to an
end. One more reason to mourn, as if there weren’t enough of those already.
But it is not just violence that is sweeping over Hong Kong, but also at least some
semblance of law and order: the People’s Congress in Beijing has decided to pass
a National Security Law for Hong Kong. Under Article 18 of the Basic Law, national
laws are not valid in Hong Kong unless they are listed in Annex III to the Basic Law.
This exception is to be explicitly limited to defence and foreign policy matters and
those specifically mentioned in the Basic Law. At the same time, however, it is for
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress to decide what laws to
include in this Annex. The competence to determine the limits of this competence
lies with Beijing, not Hong Kong. That competence is now being exercised by the
central authority. And there is no-one who is authorized to say: You mustn’t.
Which brings us to the notorious German topic of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the
competence to determine the limits of competence, a topic which Edmund Stoiber
used to gibber about so admirably back in his days, and without the exclusive
possession of which, according to orthodox German doctrine, collective self-
determination and popular sovereignty are unthinkable. Now, the EU, in sharp
contrast to China, has of course no armed forces under its command, to name
but the most obvious of the many reasons why any equation between both is
out of the question. But the suspicion that a democratically deficient whole like
the EU could, in relation to its member state parts, usurp the power to control
its own limits of competence, has put German constitutional doctrine under
tremendous strain for decades. And now, with the recent ultra-vires ruling of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht, that suspicion has turned into an affirmation.
The borders of competence
A) Where the borders of EU competence lie is regulated in the Treaties and is
therefore a question of European law. B) Where the EU’s limits of competence lie is
decided by the Member States and is therefore a question of constitutional law. Both
sentences are as true as they are incompatible with each other. From a scientific
perspective, one could go mad. But legal practice had basically already found a
balance in the 1980s that seemed to make the coexistence of the incompatible by
and large possible: Usually, you will do your thing and we do ours and we will leave
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you alone. In the event that your thing gets completely out of hand, however, we
reserve the right to make sure that we won’t be involved.
Strictly speaking, of course, this only shifted the dilemma one step up: You can go
right back to arguing about who decides when a conflict is so bad that it qualifies
as getting totally out of hand. The Solange reservation and its siblings did not
solve the dilemma. (Neither, by the way, would the old proposal which EPP Group
leader Manfred Weber has now brought back into play, namely to install a new
"competence court" instead of the notoriously integration-crazy and therefore
allegedly untrustworthy ECJ, in order to patrol the EU’s competence borders.) But it
kept it manageable. It left open what has to remain open. Thus the field of tension
between the two poles of the dilemma was turned into a fertile garden which for
many years bore a rich harvest (and many a thistle, too). In recent years there have
been more and more short circuits, though, in Denmark, in Italy, which, thank God,
did not do much permanent damage after all. This could be different now with the
Karlsruhe mega meltdown in the ECB case.
Perhaps the greatest thing about constitutional law in general is not so much what it
determines as what it keeps open. The constitutionally ordered world is not a world
of order and harmony, but one of incompatibilities which are keeps in an unstable
balance through a precarious force field of fundamental rights, duties to protect,
competences and procedural rules: individuality and sociality, unity and diversity,
power and commitment – a fascinating, ceaseless, often astonishingly permanent
vortex of incompatible things, if you look at it from that angle.
What keeps this state of affairs precarious is not least the fact that all the time all
sorts of latter-day Carl Schmitts keep coming in to demand: What kind of order is
this? How are we supposed to know what’s what? This or that, which is it going to
be? That must be decided! And if you want to know who should decide and in whose
favour: we actually have a pretty solid idea about that right away.
I don’t want decision. I insist on not deciding. I insist on keeping things open, on
tertium datur, on the open force field between the poles of incompatibility. Because
that is the only place where I can breathe. This is not neutralism nor fence-sitting,
on the contrary: I know all the more clearly what I am fighting for and against. I
am against the unambiguous. I am not on the side of those who want to have
Kompetenz-Kompetenz all for themselves, whatever side that is. I am neither on the
side of those who, in the name of the people, family and fatherland, seek to order the
world in categories of superiority and inferiority, of belonging and not belonging. Nor
am I on the side of those who strive to harmonise every regulatory obstacle out of
the way of the free play of the law of the strongest.
I will not take sides between those two. And when I look around the world, I am not
at all sure what ultimately distinguishes them from each other anyway.
The week on Verfassungsblog
… is summarized by LENNART KOKOTT:
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The Hong Kong Security Act has passed the People’s Congress and it does
not bode well for the rule of law worldwide. MAX STEINBEIS talked to DAVID
LAW in Corona Constitutional #30 about the recent developments, including the
responsibility of academics when civil liberties are at stake. Speaking of civil liberties,
LUÍSA NETTO looks at the Brazilian government’s response to the Covid-19
pandemic, which dramatically disregards scientific knowledge, and against this
background sheds light on what a human right to science could mean for citizens,
but also for other state organs demanding action from the government. From illiterate
to illiberal democracy: KIERAN BRADLEY discusses JOHN COTTER’s proposal
to deny Hungarian representatives to attend Council meetings on the basis of Art.
10 TEU and concludes that this would not be a good idea: crises of the rule of
law cannot be solved by disregarding the rules of law, he writes. Disregard of the
rule of law takes place in Poland as well, particularly in the appointment of judges,
write MICHA# KRAJEWSKI and MICHA# ZIÓ#KOWSKI, and note that the election
of the new First President of the Supreme Court raises serious doubts about the
independence of the court. MIMOZA BECIRI presents the constitutional situation
in Kosovo, where in the midst of the pandemic, the Prime Minister received a
vote of no confidence, as a result of which the President of the country initiated a
constitutionally unsustainable procedure to form a new government. In South Korea,
much praised for its fight against the virus, religious freedom is suffering under
containment measures where government agencies early on publicly denounced a
religious sect, writes CIARÁN BURKE. Paraguay is another example of a country
with a successful health strategy, which, according to CARLOS CÉSAR TRAPANI,
did not, however, take place along constitutional lines, but involved questionable
methods of constitutional interpretation and a low degree of mutual control between
the branches of government.
RÍÁN DERRIG presents the regulatory theory of nudging, a libertarian alternative
to state intervention, which has been well received by many governments in recent
years. Its shortcomings, he states, become obvious in response to the pandemic.
For LAUREN TONTI, one regulatory issue that governments should consider sooner
rather than later is the need for a long-term strategy for dealing with the virus, which
might include a discussion of vaccination obligations.
In Germany, the long-term strategy is still in progress, but the short-term strategy
has recently led to the re-start of the Bundesliga, albeit in front of empty stands.
STEFFEN UPHUES discusses whether this is the result of good lobbying or the
consequence of a proportionate approach to the fundamental right to freedom
of occupation. Meanwhile, the pandemic has so far not been able to persuade
the responsible supreme authorities of the Länder to stop the deportation of
refugees. ANNIKA FISCHER-UEBLER has written down why such a stop would
be necessary and, indeed, legally required. FELIX HANSCHMANN deals with the
state’s educational mandate in the pandemic and explains that it is the task of the
state and school authorities to provide the necessary learning materials as school
attendance is restricted. Such questions of residence and education law also point to
constellations of German federalism in the fight against the crisis. SABINE KROPP
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argues that the much-scolded federal system is better suited for this purpose than
the wishful thinking of an all-competent central state.
Last week, the Federal Constitutional Court caused a stir with its decision on the
BND law governing the German Federal Intelligence Service, in which it adjudicated
that the fundamental rights of the Grundgesetz bind the state in the exertion of
state powers abroad. TIMO SCHWANDER presents the decision and points out
which questions remain open. MATTHIAS LEHNERT writes about another decision
of the FCC that deals with the judicial review of conversions to Christianity in
asylum proceedings – the FCC, he maintains, makes certain clarifications, but they
do not extend to remaining problems in the evaluation of evidence undertaken
by administrative courts. SASCHA WOLF looks ahead to the FCC’s upcoming
decision in the Seehofer case and uses the case dealing with the limits of ministerial
freedom of expression as an opportunity to question the concept of Amtsautorität
(official authority) and its role in the FCC’s setting of standards. JENS T. THEILEN
deals with a decision of the Federal Court of Justice in which the court interprets
provisions on intersexuality in the Personenstandsgesetz (Law on Personal Status)
and points to the political dimension of the interpretation, in which a problematic
biological essentialism is expressed.
PHILIPP DÜRR looks at the possible procurement of armed drones for the German
Bundeswehr. Both the acquisition and the use of such weapon systems are possible
under constitutional and international law, the acquisition may even be required
under constitutional law, he argues.
The PSPP ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court has continued to emit waves of
shock and awe this week. In Corona Constitutional #28, CHRISTOPH KRENN talks
to ALEXANDER MELZER about the way in which the ECJ works and produces its
rulings, which differs significantly from that of the FCC – a fact that may contribute to
the strained relationship between the courts. ALBERTO ALEMANNO also looks at
the working methods of the ECJ, which have been under much public srutiny so far,
partly due to the reticence of the court. This will probably change now that not only
the decisions of the ECJ, but also the court itself are increasingly being the object of
public scrutiny, he maintains. 
Meanwhile, criticism of the FCC continues. In a joint statement, R. DANIEL
KELEMEN, PIET EECKHOUT, FEDERICO FABBRINI, LAURENT PECH and
RENÁTA UITZ underline that national courts, for the sake of European legal unity,
must not ignore ECJ rulings, but must suggest other solutions if they consider court
decisions to be incompatible with their national constitutional system. This statement
co-signed by 32 leading EU lawyers is contradicted by MARCIN BARANSKI, FILIPE
BASTOS BRITO and MARTIJN VAN DE BRINK who warn against further damage
to the European immigration by taking a "take it or leave it approach" towards the
member state’s reservations with respect to Kompetenz-Kompetenz. The FCC’s
European vision would amount to a financially passive Union and would result
in economic and social distortions similar to those of the acute euro crisis, writes
EVANGELOS VENIZELOS (who, having been the Greek Minister of Finance
back then, was in the room where it happened in those days). The Bundesbank
is now confronted with a norm conflict at the highest level, for which there are
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no agreed collision rules, ANDRÁS JAKAB and PÁL SONNEVEND state. The
fact that the ruling has thus provoked an inevitable breach of law is a problem for
European integration as well as for the rule of law in the Union, they write. In Corona
Constitutional #29, CHRISTIAN WALTER talks to MAX STEINBEIS about the
consequences of the judgement for the institutions obliged to implement it. 
In the final week of the Covid-19 and States of Emergency symposium PAUL
KALINICHENKO and ELIZAVETA MOSKOVKINA present the initially hesitant,
then increasingly vigorous Russian approach, the legal basis of which, however,
remains ambiguous, especially for citizens. KWAKU AGYEMAN-BUDU analyses
the answer to the pandemic in Ghana with regard to the constitutional framework.
In China, a Fraenkel-style prerogatory state has been in full bloom in the fight
against the pandemic, writes EVA PILS, who sees a lasting constitutional problem
in the confrontation of such an approach with that of liberal constitutional states.
MICHAEL MEYER-RESENDE looks at the member states of the European Union,
most of which perceive themselves to fall into the latter category, and identifies
the main challenges for the rule of law as a result of containment measures
against the coronavirus. The studies of the Global Access to Justice Project on the
negative consequences of the pandemic for access to justice, presented by DIOGO
ESTEVES and KIM ECONOMIDES, examine a similar context. Finally, JOELLE
GROGAN brings together the many different strands of this impressive fifty-day
symposium, and wraps it up by highlighting the most worrying developments in the
global emergency caused by the pandemic as well as best practice examples to be
derived from the comparative analysis the symposium has undertaken.
So much for this week. To conclude, let me remind you that we keep
depending on your support which you could give us either via bank transfer
(paypal@verfassungsblog.de, DE41 1001 0010 0923 7441 03, BIC PBNKDEFF) or
with a voluntary subscription on the crowdfunding platform Steady. If you haven’t
done so yet: please! If you have: thank you! Either way: all the best!
Max Steinbeis
P.S. By the way, you can also book an ad in this editorial, e.g. for job offers or
anything of that kind. Do shoot me an email if you’re interested! You might reach just
the right kind of audience that way.
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